The Need for a Specialized
Immigration Court: A Practical
Response

LEON WILDES*

It is a privilege to comment upon Maurice Roberts' proposed
statute for a specialized statutory immigration court with separate trial and appellate divisions. My comments will be restricted
to a review of the practicalproblems posed by the present system and consideration of whether the proposal of Mr. Roberts
would be useful in remedying these problems.
At the outset, I must admit to be prejudiced in favor of any reasonable proposal which might follow so incisive an analysis of the
inherent inconsistencies in our current immigration system, particularly one which might be suggested by the distinguished former Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Mr. Roberts
correctly describes the built-in schizophrenic condition of the
present immigration system as the root cause of many of the basic failings of the existing system.
THE PRESENT SYSTEM-BUILT-IN ScmzoPREmNIA

The present system invests district directors with the power
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and responsibility to take action necessary to remove illegal
aliens. At the same time, it vests the same district directors with
a mandate to adjudicate numerous benefit and relief provisions
for the benefit of aliens. It is no wonder, given the contemporary
pressures for the removal of illegal aliens as unfair competition in
the work market, that the work force of the Immigration and Naturalization Service focuses on the discharge of its enforcement
duties. As a result, applications and petitions for immigration
benefits may languish for months and even years before they are
adjudicated, resulting in a condition which has hardly enhanced
the public perception of the effectiveness of the Service.
It would seem, therefore, that it is to everyone's advantage to
separate the Service's enforcement functions from those within
its benefit-adjudicative jurisdiction. My initial reaction to Mr.
Roberts' proposal is that it does not really accomplish this noble
goal.
The ProposalHas Surface Appeal
There are distinct advantages to a proposal for the establishment of a United States Immigration Court and an Appellate Division. Prior to the proposal of this enticing plan, the most
enlightened view which had been presented was that of the statutory formalization of the Board of Immigration Appeals. That appellate body, while very much an integral part of our present
immigration system, is nevertheless still a creature of regulation
and subject to abolition by mere regulatory amendment.
Under the proposed system, the District Director is clearly a
prosecuting officer whose function would be to issue charges commencing exclusion, deportation and rescission proceedings. The
deportation order would not be entered by an administrative official, but would bear the imprimatur of a judicial body.1 Presumably, the District Director's trial attorneys would appear to
represent him before the court as they now do before the immigration judge. Such a court would not only command greater public respect, but would also have greater independence from the
Immigration Service than ever before in immigration history.
With appointments made by the President and confirmed with
the advice and consent of the Senate for an extensive term and
1. See § 8 of the proposed statute, Trial Division Jurisdiction,which would
give jurisdiction to the trial court to hear exclusion, deportation and rescission

hearings. There is no direct indication as to how the Immigration Service would

be represented before this body, but we are assuming that the District Director,

rather than the United States Attorney, will undertake the function of prosecuting
matters before this court.
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with compensation which would be commensurate with those of
federal district judges, 2 the positions would attract lawyers of
greater competence. No longer would these positions be held almost exclusively, as at present, by former trial attorneys, many of
whom have difficulty in making the transition from prosecutor to
judge.
The proposed system would also have the advantage of avoiding
many of the claims of procedural improprieties which now clutter
the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. This would
necessarily follow from the gradual adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil and Criminal Procedure which one hopes would occur. A
multiplicity of applications, petitions, and appeals would be
avoided if the trial division judges had the full power to adjudicate all applications for discretionary relief and also had the exercise of the full range of discretionary authority granted to the
Attorney General by law.3 This would presumably free other immigration officials for the more prompt adjudication of other applications for benefits in cases which did not involve trials. One
would expect the morale of Service officers to be much higher
once the backlog of unadjudicated applications is cleared and applications are reached more promptly in the general course of
business.
RADICAL SURGERY-BUT WILL rr CURE THE PATIENT?

One could almost be lulled, by such a positive and optimistic
analysis, into a feeling of hope for the entire immigration process.
Unfortunately, the practical facts of the situation do not permit
so optimistic a conclusion. More sober reflection leads this writer
to question the efficacy of Mr. Roberts' proposed panacea.
No one who has practiced extensively in the field of immigration law can argue with the basic premise motivating Mr. Roberts'
proposal, namely, that the existing administrative and judicial
2. See proposed statute §§ 1, 2.
3. Note, however, that the proposal as it stands does not provide for this authority and does not as yet address the problem of the limited jurisdiction of im-

migration judges in deportation proceedings. For example, there is no authority
within the course of the deportation proceeding before an immigration judge to
adjudicate a petition for preference status pursuant to the terms of § 204 of the Im-

migration and Nationality Act as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1976 & Supp. In 1979)
or applications for nonimmigrant standing pursuant to § 214 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (1976). See also 8 C.F.. §§ 204, 214 (1980).

mechanisms for adjudicating immigration-related matters such as
excludability and deportability are vastly in need of streamlining
and overhaul. However, on a practical level, there is clearly some
question as to whether the radical surgery which he has proposed
is required in order to effect the necessary changes.
It would seem that if, in actuality, the creation of a statutory immigration court does not eliminate all areas of both administrative and judicial concurrent jurisdiction, the practical effect of the
proposal will be to further duplicate the legal process. Alternatively, if such a proposal is successful in eliminating concurrent
jurisdiction and insulates the adjudicative and appeal procedures
within a single specialized statutory court dealing only with immigration matters, the restrictions and self-insulation of this single
system will result in great prejudice to aliens.
The present system calls for decision-making processes and adjudications taking place at all levels of the Immigration Service in
a variety of jurisdictions. Sections 236 and 242 lay out the jurisdiction of immigration judges in exclusion and deportation proceedings and section 106(a) provides for direct appeal to the United
States circuit courts.4
Concurrently, petitions for certain exemptions, waivers and
preferences5 are decided at the district office level, subject to appeal to the Regional Commissioner, or the Board of Immigration
Appeals and ultimately to the Attorney General.
Applications for waivers and relief can in certain circumstances
be made or must be made to the Immigration Service,6 while in
other circumstances immigration judges have been granted jurisdiction. Similarly, claims for asylum and refugee status are sometimes required to be presented to the District Director and on
other occasions in the course of a proceeding before an immigration judge.
All denials of applications and/or petitions are subject to motions to reopen and/or reconsider in accordance with procedures
prescribed by regulation. 7 In addition to the supposed "exclusive" remedy of appeal to the courts of appeals in exclusion and
4. There is no statutory provision nor any mention in the statute whatsoever
of the Board of Immigration Appeals, which is an administratively created board.
See 8 C.F.R. § 3 (1980).
5. With regard to exemptions and waivers, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.2(c), (d), 212.3,

212.7 (1980). With regard to preferences, see 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (1980).
6. Examples of relief within the granting power of the immigration judge are
voluntary departure, suspension of deportation and adjustment of status pursuant
to the Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 244, 245, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1255 (1976 &
Supp. I 1979).
7. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8, 103.5 (1980).
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deportation proceedingsS there exist numerous collateral actions
which can be brought to secure mandamus, declaratory relief, injunctive relief or habeas corpus. These, and other forms of relief
at the district court level, have evolved to protect other aspects of
the alien's status in the United States against prejudicial action
by immigration and labor department officials.9
The question must be asked: Does this proposal of establishing
an article I court improve the situation? Perhaps, if the rights of
the alien would be strengthened by the implementation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The proposal does not address this very difficult question and probably cannot due to the unique character of an immigration proceeding.' 0
What is proposed, rather than a broadening of the alien's rights,
is a mere upgrading of the stature of immigration judges, with no
assurance whatsoever that the alien will receive any tangible benefit from the fact that he has appeared before an article I court.
Moreover, there is no appeal to a non-immigration court where
the principles of general law may be brought to bear upon this
special area of the law and a broader perspective achieved.
At present, the alien appears before an administrative judge
who is, without doubt, unduly fettered by the supervisory and
other powers of the United States Department of Justice over the
facilities and activities of the immigration judge. The judge is beholden to the government for all his physical facilities as well as
his administrative amenities. This is doubtless a condition which
must be changed. The alien now appears before the immmigration judge with the benefit of a clear statutory right to have re8. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1976).
9. For actions under the Declaratory Judgment Act see 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(Supp. 11I 1979); for actions under the Administrative Procedure Act see 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706 (1976).
10. Although the federal courts have acknowledged for years that deportation
and banishment can deprive an individual of "all that makes his life worth living,"
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922), protection of the alien has never
been allowed to parallel completely that provided for an individual accused of a
criminal offense based upon the established principle that deportation proceedings and immigration matters are civil rather than criminal in nature. See, e.g.,
Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir., cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); Marcello v.
Kennedy, 194 F. Supp. 750, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (maintaining that deportation statutes are not penal in nature and deportation is not punishment).

tained counsel present" and to certain other aspects of a fair
hearing assured to him by his fifth amendment right to procedural due process. However, he continues to be frustrated in achieving his rights in such crucial aspects of a fair hearing as, for
example, his ability to compel the attendance of witnesses necessary for his own defense. For this vital right, which is clearly encompassed in the procedural due process to which he should be
entitled, he must necessarily present his request for the issuance
of a subpeona to the immigration judge. The proposed article I
court procedure makes no change in this unfortunate situation.
Although it might be implied that an article I court would accord
the alien compulsory process, there can be no assurance that this
type of problem would be solved without the formal acceptance of
the federal procedural rules by statutory fiat.
The Power to Adjudicate
Nor is the proposed legislation likely to solve most of the
problems inherent in the present litigative process before administrative immigration judges. The essence of the practitioner's
primary objection to the current procedures is the bifurcation of
jurisdiction to grant the alien needed relief. The immigration
judge does not have the full panoply of jurisdictional authority
that he requires to truly dispose of all the issues involved in the
litigation before him. Petitions for preference status, for example,
must be transmitted to the District Director for his adjudication.12
Independence of the Immigration Judge
The practitioner's second basic objection to the present system
lies in the lack of independence of the immigration judge. In the
overwhelming majority of cases the government still relies upon
interrogating the alien himself to establish not only the elements
of deportability, excludability or rescission, but also the alien's eligibility for those few discretionary benefits which the judge has
jurisdiction to determine as well. The alien often cannot distinguish which is the government's prosecuting trial attorney and
11. Immigration and Nationality Act § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976). See also Immigration and Nationality Act § 242 (b) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (2) (1976).
12. Immigration judges have no authority to grant temporary waivers of inadmissibility, waivers of the foreign residence requirement on J visas, extensions of
temporary stay, change of status from one immigrant status to another, reinstatement of student or other temporary status or certain waivers of inadmissibility for
immigrants. They cannot even terminate proceedings pending before them for humanitarian reasons or because they were improvidently begun. Nor can they hold
a recalcitrant alien in contempt See C. GORDON &IL ROSENFIELD, IWMMGRA7ON
LAW AND PRocEmDUR § 5.7(g) (1973).
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which is the government's impartial adjudicator.13 The alien often
faces, in the trial attorney and the immigration judge, what he
perceives to be two representatives of the interests of the government. This gives the impression of unfairness.
While the advent of an article I immigration court would be welcomed by the bar, such an innovative institution is not necessary
to cure the present ills of the system. Indeed, unless sweeping revisions of substantive and procedural law are a part of such legislation, it may cause more problems than it cures. The problems
perceived by the alien and his counsel as to the immigration
judge's impartiality could be cured, in large part, by according immigration judges broad jurisdiction to adjudicate petitions and applications for immigration benefits and waivers. In addition, the
incorporation into present procedures of more of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would cure many of the procedural ills of
the present system and result in a fairer hearing. A rule, for example, permitting compulsory process by the respondent in a deportation proceeding without having to request the issuance of a
subpeona from the immigration judge, is sorely needed. Likewise,
a closer adherence to the evidentiary rules of federal courts
would avoid the admission in evidence of many questionable documents, whose sources are not subject to cross-examination.
Since the right to cross-examine is a present statutory right of an
alien in such proceedings,' 4 there should be no difficulty in securing this right without a major statutory overhaul. A revision of
the current regulation would suffice. Some protection against the
admissibility, for example, of a report of an investigation by a consular staff member who is not available for cross-examination is
needed to assure a fair due process hearing in behalf of the alien
respondent. This might be secured by a regulation authorizing an
alien to depose the Consul or his staff member in writing. It is to
be noted that none of this necessarily requires an article I court.
Nor, under the proposed plan, would the advent of an article I
court necessarily cure this type of problem which occurs continuously in contested proceedings before immigration judges.
13. See 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1980), particularly § 242.8 designating the powers of the
special inquiry officers in § 242.9 which does not provide for the mandatory assign-

ment of a trial attorney.
14. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (3) (1976).

There is no statutory authority for the right of cross-examination in exclusion proceedings, but this is provided for in the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1980).

THE AVOIDANCE OF DUPLICATION
The proposal implies that the creation of a statutory court will
have the effect of streamlining the procedure for administrative
and judicial review. However, this apparent result is quite deceptive when one focuses upon the problem of initial administrative
review. Here there is a dilemma. If all decisions of the District
Director are subject to review in the statutory court, an onerous
burden is placed upon an applicant who requires reconsideration
of a decision based upon incomplete information or blatant error.15

A typical example would be the review of a denial of an application for change of nonimmigrant status from visitor to student
where the denial was based on a failure to file a timely application for such benefit. The present procedure, which permits the
filing of a motion to reconsider, explaining the excusable circumstances or the submission of proof of timely filing, is much more
appropriate than the onerous burden of filing a formal appeal in a
formal judicial tribunal, particularly for an unrepresented alien.
Similar examples abound, e.g., appeals of denials of petitions or
applications for alleged failure to prosecute such applications in
cases where, because of changes of the applicant's address, notification by the Service did not reach the alien or, in recent years
the common occurrence, where notices given by the alien did not
reach his fie at the Immigration Service. A full court appeal in
such a case would be tantamount to using a cannon to hit a fly.
If one is precluded from administrative review in such circumstances he is severely prejudiced. On the other hand, if such opportunity for administrative review is still allowed under the
proposed system, there will be a burgeoning new area of conflict
and litigation as to the scope of this administrative review which,
as past history has shown, will develop into an entire administrative-judicial system interplaying with such established issues and
problems of administrative law as exhaustion of administrative
remedies. This would hardly simplify the present procedures.
JUDIcIAL REVIEW BY GENERALIST JUDGES-IS

IT DESIRABLE?

Perhaps more significant than the futility of attempting to
streamline a system by adding a new layer to it is the general pol-

icy question of whether we in fact do wish to insulate all immigration procedure and review within one specialized body. Given the
15. Parenthetically, an enormous burden would be placed upon this new statutory court requiring them to adjudicate an enormous volume of work which is basically trivial in nature.

[voL 18: 53, 1980]

Immigration Court Response
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

potential for delay and occasional conflicting or inconsistent decisions which may result from allowing general federal jurisdiction
in appeals and collateral actions, the desirability for analysis by
generalists should never be underestimated. It is one extremely
valuable ingredient which is added when courts of general jurisdiction review immigration matters. Much of the innovation, progress and forward-looking law which has been developed and
created in the immigration field is a direct result of the opportunity given to courts of general jurisdiction to take a fresh look at a
policy, procedure or ruling which has been developed and taken
for granted by the Service, immigration judges and even by the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
Numerous examples abound. The decision in Lennon v. INS16
established that use of the term "illicit possession" in section
212(a) (23) of the Immigration and Nationality Act implied a mens
rea requirement before a conviction for possession of marijuana
might be used to exclude the alien from the United States. This
holding goes against the mainstream of administrative law in the
immigration field with regard to the treatment of foreign convictions. The result would probably have been different had the argument and issue been presented before a specialized
immigration court-a court perhaps overly enamored with the administrative and judicial history regarding the treatment of foreign convictions.
The evolution, at least in some circuits,17 of a right or benefit
available pursuant to prescribed criteria of "deferred action"18
status also probably could not occur if cases were not presented
before a "generalist" court.19 When a matter involving an issue as
important as a person's liberty is at stake, particularly in a deportation or exclusion context, that person should rightfully have an
opportunity to raise such issue before a court which has broad
general experience and familiarity with how valuable rights in
16. 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975).
17. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979), where the Ninth Circuit concluded that Operations Instruction § 103.1 (a) (1) confers a "substantial
benefit upon the alien rather than setting up an administrative convenience."
18. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALZATION SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS § 103.1(a) (1)

(1979).
19. See Wildes, The Operations Instructionsof the Immigration Service: Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99 (1979).

other areas of civil and criminal practice are litigated and determined. 20
CONCLUSION

It is therefore this author's opinion that a less radical proposal
would have the greatest potential to overcome the many inadequacies of the present system, while at the same time creating a
minimum of new problems.
Clearly, it is necessary to deal with the major objection to the
present system, namely, the lack of independence of the immigration judges. This would require the transfer, by statute, of hearings presently before such judges either to administrative law
judges under the Administrative Procedure Act, or to a newly
formed independent statutory agency, separate and apart from
the Immigration Service. Enabling legislation must provide for
adequate staffing and separate facilities. At the same time, the
Board of Immigration Appeals necessarily must be given statutory authority, preferably within the same separate statutory
body. Under such an arrangement, there would be no need to
change the present direct appeal to the United States circuit
courts of appeals prescribed under section 106(a). The alien
would thus have his matter heard before an independent body of
immigration judges with a direct appeal to a statutory Board of
Immigration Appeals and a right to judicial review, as at present,
in a court of general jurisdiction.
The limited authority of immigration judges under the present
system to dispose of a matter completely because they lack jurisdiction to adjudicate many necessary related petitions and applications must likewise be remedied. This would require that
authority to adjudicate many additional types of applications for
benefits be granted to immigration judges in cases which are
properly before them, perhaps on a concurrent basis with the immigration officers who presently enjoy such authority. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure either in toto or selectively, to provide for a
fair hearing is also necessary to assure compliance with procedural due process rights under the fifth amendment.
20. Interestingly enough, the evolution of the Immigration Service's administrative position with regard to "out of wedlock children as stepchildren" under the
statutory definition as described in Mr. Roberts' footnote 14, where the Service
was required to respond to decisions in Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), and Hyppolite v. Sweeny, Civ. No. 77-1865 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 1979), digested in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 62 (1979) highlights how courts of general jurisdiction can prod
the Immigration Service to take a more liberal and compassionate view in interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act.

62
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The adequate funding of such a separate agency is essential to
its independence and to assure that it will attract attorneys of the
highest calibre to hold positions as immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The enabling legislation should set minimal standards for judges, prescribe their
terms of office, and assure the availability of support services so
that decisions might be issued promptly. With the additional duties and broader jurisdiction, a larger number of immigration
judges and a larger Board of Immigration Appeals may be required, permitting the Board to send roving panels to hear argument in various geographic locations throughout the United
States, as needed.
The existence of different holdings in various circuits of the federal system in all areas of the law is simply a characteristic of the
federal judiciary system. There is nothing which warrants addressing this situation separately within the field of immigration
law. The present practice of the Board of Immigration Appeals of
following the mandate of the local circuit court of appeals is appropriate and, in the opinion of this author, requires no change.
Indeed, there is less conflict among circuits in the immigration
field than in other fields of the law.
We must exercise caution that, in our efforts to achieve an acknowledged, desirable goal, our proposed solution does not create
more problems than it solves. The prospect of requiring an unrepresented alien to present a request for the reconsideration of
an application denied on some minor technicality in the austere
atmosphere of an article I court is not at all enticing. Nor does it
give the impression that one is being cost-conscious in problem
solving. Likewise, the elimination of an appeal to a court of general jurisdiction is a change not lightly to be undertaken. While
the proposal has many desirable aspects and would likely be a
great boon to the legal profession, it appears to this writer to resemble radical surgery, not to be undertaken until all other alternative remedies have proved unavailing.

